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Summary  Aim of the paper is to point out some of the factors that affect safety of control system. Already in initial 
stages of the control system life-cycle it is necessary to analyze the effect of each of these factors on safety of a 
designed control system. Following this analysis, it is possible to propose appropriate measures for achieving 
specified safety goals. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The control system is expected to execute control 
task with required level of availability. There is a 
special group of safety-relevant control systems with 
an addition request, that their malfunction will cause 
no injuries, considerable material harms, 
environmental destruction or other unwanted results. 
Safety as system property depends on several factors, 
that are close-knitted and their effects on the safety 
must be considered right from initial phase of the 
system life-cycle [1]. The level of safety can be 
evaluated quantitatively and/or qualitatively, by 
evaluation of its primary attributes – integrity, 
availability and confidentiality. The used measure of 
preferring a single safety attribute depends on a 
particular application [2]. 
2. PRIMARY FACTORS AFFECTING SAFETY 
OF CONTROLLED PROCESS  
2.1. Redundancy rate in data processing 
Function of redundancy in the system is to ensure 
some kind of response to failure. From this point of 
view redundancy can serve the purpose of: 
 fault detection; 
 fault masking; 
 fault recovery.  
If the reason of use of redundancy in the system is 
the reliability parameters improvement, then it is 
called reservation and use of redundant resources in 
the system is specified with the term backup. The 
system backup parts are those, whose use would have 
been useless, if the other parts of system had not 
worked correctly. That means, the term redundancy is 
wider term as backup.  
If the reason of using redundancy in the system is 
to ensure improvement of its safety parameters, then 
redundancy is used only for failure detection (e.g. on 
the base of comparing results of multiple identical 
solutions tasks).  
With appropriate use of redundancy it is possible 
to achieve an improvement of reliability and safety 
parameters.  
According to, which redundant resources were 
used, we know the following forms of redundancy: 
 Hardware redundancy – reservation of 
construction parts on all system levels; 
 Software redundancy – implementation of 
diagnostic programs (they are not necessary 
for control function performance), repeating 
and multiple calculation programs; 
 Information redundancy – the coding 
utilization for failure detection or failure 
correction; 
 Time redundancy – additional time demands 
improvement of calculation with relation to 
information and software redundancy, or 
extension of calculation time due to its 
repeating. 
The use of one redundancy form generally 
implies the use of another form of redundancy. 
Therefore wider redundancy classification is often 
used:  
 Space redundancy; 
 Time redundancy. 
Space redundancy is adherent to hardware 
resources, whose use can be evoked by hardware 
redundancy, but also e.g. software and information 
redundancy, because existence of both these 
redundancy forms is generally bound to hardware. 
Time redundancy is usually bound to software, 
information and time redundancy resources. 
2.2. System reliability 
Generally, system operation must be regarded 
together with: 
 Failures caused by environmental effects; 
 Systematic failures; 
 Random failures caused by system aging.  
It is possible to avoid the failures caused by 
environmental effects (completely or partially), if 
during system design there are used such 
technological and circuit solutions, that meet the 
boundary conditions of operation environment. 
Operation environment of the system must be selected 
in accordance with specification of system 
requirements. This kind of solution also eliminates 
possible violation of mutual independence of system 
elements caused by environmental effects. However, 
in data transfer the environmental effects cannot 
generally be ignored. 
Systematic failures do not occur as a result of 
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system aging, but their occurrence is bound to the 
specific situation and state of the system. Essential 
part of systematic failures is bond to mistakes, made 
in system development (e.g. software errors). One of 
the most important activities in development of the 
safety-critical control system is definition of 
functional requirements. Specification of functional 
requirements must be unambiguous, understandable, 
complete, consistent and controllable. Therefore it is 
recommended to realize it on the basis of semi-formal 
and formal methods. These methods are generally 
supported by software tools, which can serve the 
purpose of an automatic code generation and in final 
consequence also simplify system verification and 
validation. Such methods and techniques aimed at 
minimisation of systematic faults in software 
considerably help to increase the functional system 
safety. 
The application of measures to failure prevention 
can considerably minimize failure occurrence caused 
by environmental effects and systematic failures. 
Evasion of accidental failures caused by system aging 
is impossible, therefore they must be considered 
during system operation.   
Intensity occurrence of critical failures of the i-th 
system element can be very difficult or impossible to 
estimate. Therefore pessimistic assumption is 
generally accepted, that each element failure is 
potentially critical. Such assumption is acceptable, 
because  
  
iiK λλ ≤ , (1) 
  
where iK is the critical failure rate of the i-th 
element. In some cases such a procedure can be 
applied that is based on definition of “critical 
failures-to-all failures” ratio using long-term 
experience.  E.g. if we assume, that electronic 
elements are elements with symmetrical failure 
occurrence (probability, that the failure will have 
negative effect on system safety is approximately 
equal to probability, that the failure will not have 
negative effect on system safety), then this coefficient 
has the value 0,5. 
2.3. Fault detection and negation  
Fault detection and thereafter fault negation has 
essential significance to reinsurance of required level 
of system safety. Depending up requirements 
technical diagnostics can be in different forms 
(functional diagnostics, test diagnostics, periodical 
diagnostics, continuous diagnostics, …). From safety 
point of view it is important, that every potential 
hazardous (critical) fault is detected and negated in 
required time (considering these faults it is the test 
with full coverage).  
Functional diagnostics is used to detect faults  
affecting function of the object. The diagnostic system 
does not affect object of diagnostic with special test 
signals, but is only analysing signals created by 
activity of diagnostic object. The diagnostic system 
realized in this way can be excluded from the process 
of safety analysis and therefore it can use standard 
methods and techniques of information processing. 
Such a form of diagnostics is usually insufficient for 
safety – critical control systems.  
Measures used to negate faults can be effective 
only if the fault is identified. Therefore the safety 
critical systems generally also contain test 
diagnostics in addition to functional diagnostics. The 
diagnostic system implements specific (test) signals 
into object of diagnostics and analyses responses. In 
case, that such a diagnostic system is also used when 
the object is in operation (operation diagnostics), the 
test signals are not allowed to corrupt normal object 
activity. Test diagnostics is used to detect faults 
during operation, which are not immediately visible 
(masked faults) if the object is active, but by change 
of system state or by combination with other fault can 
lead to critical state. In this case, the test techniques 
must be exposed to safety analysis, because they can 
be as well source of faults. 
Even if the process of system elements testing 
and their faults negation is generally specific for each 
system, it must be true, that  
  { }mjprett iij ...,,2,10 ∈∀≤ , (2) 
  
where tij is detection and negation time of the j-th 
fault of the i-th element, ti0 is the maximal allowed 
time to fault detection and negation of the i-th element 
and m is a number of faults of the i-th element. Time 
ti0 can be determined on the basis of failure rate of the 
i-th element and required system safety level. 
Let the system dispose of faults detection 
mechanism whose diagnostic covering is 1≤c . Then: 
  ( )ciiM −= 1.λλ ; 
iiD c λλ .= ; 
iDiMi λλλ += ; 
(3) 
  
where iM is intensity of undetectable (masked) faults 
of  the i-th system element and iD is failure rate of 
detectable faults of the i-th system element. 
 
Advances in Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
 
156 
 
Fig. 1. Set of system faults 
Real systems generally dispose of different fault 
detection mechanisms that differ by diagnostic 
covering and/or fault detection time. It is clear, that 
some system faults can be covered by several faults 
detection mechanisms (Fig. 1).  
According to Fig. 1 failure rate of the i–th 
element can be expressed as relation 
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where n is number of detection and negation 
mechanisms of element faults; ( )jiλ  is failure rate of  
the i–th element detectable only by the j–th 
mechanism; ( )kji ,λ  is failure rate of the i–th element 
detectable by the j–th as well as the k–th mechanism  
etc. 
Multiple detection mechanisms in the system are 
implemented to increase system faults detection 
coverage. Each mechanism is characterized by 
different fault detection times. However, slower 
detection mechanism can not be used in full spread, 
because in case of fault occurrence, the fault is 
detected only if: 
 The mechanism is able to detect this fault; 
 Fault was not detected by faster mechanism. 
Likewise intensity of system transition into safe 
state after fault detection and negation of the i-th 
element can be expressed by the equation 
  
( )
=
=
n
j
jii
1
δδ , (5) 
  
where ( )jiδ  is intensity of the i–th element transition 
into safe state after fault detection and negation of the 
j–th mechanism.  
Generally, the possibility of fault detection 
mechanism failure must be also considered. Influence 
of this fact on system safety depends on particular 
system design. There is tendency to proceed in system 
design so that: 
 Test diagnostics is independent 
(functionally and physically) from control 
circuits and then the effect of failure of test 
diagnostics on system safety can be uniquely 
proved, or 
 Test diagnostics failure is identified by 
comparator mechanisms (fast diagnostics). 
2.4. Service staff mistake 
Even if we speak about control system safety, we 
have on mind safety of the controlled system. If it is a 
control system with continuous operation, than the 
control system failure is bound to two sorts of 
hazards: 
 Primary hazards – transport process can be 
endangered due to faulty realization of the 
control function by the system; 
 Secondary hazards – the system has 
protection mechanisms that get the system 
into the safe state after fault detection; safe 
state is characterized by partial or total 
reduction of control functions performance; 
in this case realization of control functions 
is taken over by the service staff; risk 
resulting from existence of these hazards 
will be proportional to probability of 
failure of this staff and time of system (or 
system part) failure. 
Apparently intensity of service staff mistakes is 
essentially higher that intensity of hazardous system 
failures, especially if it is the fail-safe system. 
Intensity of personal mistake depends on many 
objective (number of actions, operation 
accomplishment time, complexity of action, …) and 
subjective (psychic condition, qualification level…) 
factors.  
2.5. System availability 
Though system safety integrity is dominant 
attribute of system safety, it’s not the only one. 
Generally system safety can be conceptualized like 
pack of system attributes, where besides integrity 
especially system availability can be inserted [3].  
Since coefficient of availability A is defined: 
MDTMUT
MUTA
+
= , 
(7) 
where MUT is mean up time and MDT is mean down 
time, it is apparent that the higher availability of the 
system is, the lower risk of transport process will 
result from mistake of the service staff in emergency 
system operation.  
Generally, coefficient of availability can be 
improved by technical measures (e.g. using high 
reliable components in design of safety-related 
systems, using diagnostic equipment that minimizes 
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set of all faults  
EM  - set of undetected faults 
E1  - set of faults detected with 
       the 1st mechanism 
E2  - set of faults detected with 
       the 2nd mechanism  
En  - set of faults detected with 
       the n-th  mechanism 
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time to identify failures) and organizational measures 
(e.g. optional location of service centres, improving 
qualification of maintenance staff, proper technical 
manuals). 
2.6. System confidentiality 
Confidentiality is system attribute that ensures, 
that system won’t be misused by unauthorized subject. 
Term subject in this meaning does not include only 
persons, but also technical resources and software.  
Confidentiality represents hierarchically ordered 
mechanism, that guarantees required competence 
level of rights (e.g. to write and read information) in 
a given part of the control system to human or 
machine. Confidentiality level can be expressed like 
stochastic process of successful or unsuccessful 
attempts to break it. 
3. CONCLUSIONS  
System safety integrity and system availability 
are close knitted, i.e. in case that required level of 
one or another attribute becomes not ensured this may 
prevent creating of the control system with required 
quality. Fulfilling safety integrity and availability 
requirements can be achieved only if the requirements 
for no-failure operation (error and fault effect on 
system functionality), maintainability (scheduled 
maintenance, identification and localization of fault 
states, system restoration after fault) operation 
(operation mode) and maintenance (human operator 
effect on effective maintenance, maintenance 
technique etc.) are fulfilled.  
It’s necessary to note, that strict safety 
requirements on safety-critical control system can not 
be proved only by tests or using practical results. To 
prove, that safety requirements are fulfilled and final  
risk is acceptable, only proper combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods of failure effects 
analysis may be used. 
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